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Lessons Learned: James B. Lockhart III 
 
By Ben Henken and Dan Thompson 
  
Lockhart became the Director (CEO) and Chairman of the Oversight Board of the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) upon the agency’s creation on July 30, 2008. The FHFA became 
the sole regulator of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks; it also 
became the conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Prior to his position at the FHFA, 
Lockhart was, from June 2006, the Director of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO), also a regulator of Fannie and Freddie, which was subsumed into the FHFA.  
This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Lockhart. 
Focus on first things first. The government’s hands were tied until Treasury could 
provide a financial backstop for the companies, which the newly-passed Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act (HERA) allowed.  
“I mentioned the need for new legislation at the press conference on Fannie and Freddie’s 
consent agreements – so, actually, even before I had been confirmed [for my position at 
OFHEO]. People had told me to wait to confront this issue until my confirmation – but even 
at my confirmation hearing I touched upon the need for new legislation. 
I spoke a lot about the need for reform, especially new legislation to give the regulator more 
power over their capital levels. At the time, we did not have this power; these rules were set 
by Congress. My PowerPoints became infamous. It was a constant theme; I wanted new 
legislation and so did the Bush Administration. For instance, unlike for banks, the GSEs’ 
deferred tax assets were legally fully counted as capital, and they disappeared when the GSEs 
started posting losses.”  
“What was missing was a financial backstop. Otherwise, there would've been a “run on the 
bank” with no FDIC to stop it. People would've stopped buying GSE mortgage-backed 
securities and wouldn’t roll over their debt. The $10 trillion mortgage market would've dried 
up.”  
“I think the possibility of Fannie and Freddie receiving a loan from the government had been 
discussed before, but most people involved were too scared to ask for it out of fear of 
spooking the markets. We also thought doing so might make it impossible to pass new 
legislation, as some Republicans were adamantly opposed to this part of any solution.”  
“From the viewpoint of crisis prevention, I think having the ability to backstop the GSEs is 
important. Unfortunately, there’s also a moral hazard to creating this kind of backstop, which 
is why a lot of Republicans didn’t want one – because once it’s there, people will use it. 
There’s an entire philosophical debate surrounding it, but having a backstop was critical.” 
  
157
 
 
A crisis is always a Catch-22 situation. Do or say too little or too much, and you run the 
risk of spooking, rather than calming, the markets. However, in a crisis, it is important 
to prepare for a worst-case scenario without giving markets a reason to believe that 
such a scenario is inevitable.  
“As I said in my FCIC testimony: ‘From the fall of 2007 to the conservatorships, it was a 
tightrope without a safety net.’”  
“At this point [summer 2008], the situation was such that if we decided to blow the whistle, 
all hell likely would have broken loose. If, for example, we had said that the GSEs were totally 
inadequately capitalized before receiving Hank's bazooka [Treasury’s funding authority] – 
which didn't arrive until the July 30th legislation – we had no way to bail them out. There just 
was no way to do it.”  
“The August letter you mentioned [to the GSEs indicating that they were in compliance with 
statutory capital levels] was based on their financials as of June 30th. However, in the letter 
we told them that we were seriously concerned about the deterioration of the housing 
market and had discretionary authority to lower their classification. Over time, we 
repeatedly ramped up our warnings. Again, as of June 30th, the two entities were adequately 
capitalized according to the law. The capital requirement was so low, however, that even a 
little hiccup in the market had the potential to cause a big problem. And what we saw was a 
big hiccup. 
It was a difficult situation. As I’ve said, we didn’t want to cause a ‘run on the bank’ until we 
were ready and able to do something about it. We weren't ready to do something about it at 
that point. As early as around the rescue of Bear Stearns, someone in the White House kept 
suggesting that Fannie and Freddie were a total mess. He was probably right. But it would 
have been a real problem if we had simply conveyed that sense of panic to the markets. We 
often felt as if we were walking a tightrope: we repeatedly put maximum pressure on Fannie 
and Freddie – and on Congress to get us the law we needed – but wanted to make sure we 
weren’t also unnecessarily spooking the markets.” 
Although sometimes overlooked in the heat of battle, human capital concerns are 
critical. Nothing gets done without people.  
“[W]e were setting up a brand-new agency; it was clearly a tense time. The FHFA also was 
inheriting the Federal Home Loan Banks – which felt as though they were being taken over 
– so we were trying to keep morale high there. But it was clear that Fannie and Freddie were 
having extreme difficulty fulfilling their missions of providing liquidity and affordability to 
the mortgage market.” 
“In Hank’s book – and maybe even Ben's and a few others’ – it was suggested that we were 
resistant to the idea of conservatorship. I think there was some resistance within our agency. 
Some of my colleagues really understood how necessary it was to intervene, but others were 
still somewhat concerned about our reputation. Still others had spent much of their 
professional lives regulating these institutions and were traumatized to see them now on the 
brink of collapse.” 
“However, in order to eventually win the support of my staff – which was important – I 
thought it necessary to allow them to have their day in court to say: ‘Maybe it's not as bad as 
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you think it is. We can get through this with a memo of understanding,’ which is what was 
done for a lot of banks during the crisis.” 
Several solutions were considered but conservatorship was the best solution given 
the fragility of the markets and the level of control needed by the federal government. 
“By this point in August, we were having regular meetings with Treasury and the Fed in 
particular. At one of these meetings, we had a discussion with Hank, who was originally 
leaning toward receivership. I let my general counsel speak in favor of almost the opposite 
position – a memo of understanding – instead of conservatorship.  But I was in the 
conservatorship school.” 
“I think [Paulson] ultimately opted for conservatorship because receivership would have 
spooked the markets too much. Even with a loan, I think there would have been a “run on 
the bank”– or at least a freezing of new mortgages – if we had chosen receivership. I think 
conservatorship was the middle ground.” 
While it may be tempting to address long-term policy issues, in a crisis, a narrow focus 
is most efficient. 
“We recognized that Fannie and Freddie were the ‘only game in town,’ and we wanted to 
figure out a way to keep the mortgage market going.”  
“Under conservatorship, we effectively were the CEOs of the two firms. We kept the two 
boards in place – although we replaced most of their members – thinking that this would be 
good for governance. Frankly, as Hank has said, we thought the conservatorships were going 
to serve as a “time out” for Fannie and Fannie. Perhaps they would last a couple of years in 
order to build a culture of good governance. The boards have been helpful in this respect.” 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
Dated: August 2019 
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